This paper examines the potency of the concept of ›empire‹ in Carolingian history, arguing against the still recent trend in medieval studies of seeing the Carolingian empire as having been in a constant state of decay. An initial historiographical overview of medievalist's perceptions of ›empire‹ over the past century is followed by a discussion of how Carolingian authors themselves constructed, perceived and were influenced by notions of ›empire‹. Biblical scholars like Hraban Maur initiated an authoritative discourse on imperium, which in turn, after the 840s, heavily influenced later authors, perhaps most interestingly Paschasius Radbertus in his Epitaphium Arsenii. While the writings of these authors who looked back at Louis's reign have often been interpreted as revealing a decline of imperial ideals, they must rather be seen as testifying to a long-lasting concern for a universal Carolingian empire.
According to a strong and persistent trend in modern historiography, the ensuing Carolingian empire did not even last a century, and it was in a constant state of decay; almost from the very moment of its inception. Its modest glory is still exclusively associated with Charlemagne, who was the only Carolingian emperor with whom later empire builders deigned to identify with. When the Great Charles died in January 814, and his weak and overly pious son Louis succeeded, things went downhill rapidly. Or did the decay already start when the once vigorous king retired to Aachen after 800, an old emperor unable to keep his unruly daughters in check?
3 Certainly decline had well and truly started by 830, when Louis was faced with the first of rebellions, and at the very latest it started after Louis' death in 840 and during the subsequent division of the empire among his remaining sons in 843. 4 For then onwards, Carolingian imperial history was a muddle of competing members of the dynasty, so difficult to remember that it was something of a relief that the last legitimate emperor, aptly named Charles the Fat, was deposed in 888.
5
This was the story of the Carolingian empire as I encountered it in the early 1970s as a student of medieval history at Amsterdam University, in the extensive French, English and German bibliographies that we were expected to master. By then, the Germanic conqueror had become a patron of learning, and a champion of the heady dreams of European integration, complete with a European Karlspreis that has been awarded in Aachen since 1950. 6 Otherwise, our interest in the history of Carolingian empire was minimal, for, like all medieval political history in general, it was worlds removed from the Annales-inspired cultural history that was en vogue in the 1970s. Compared to Montaillou, medieval politics seemed rather dreary and predictable, what with lay aristocrats who were always out to undermine rulers, and bishops and abbots who were not much better; they all belonged to this power-hungry elite that soon managed to wreck the Carolingian empire. In any case, as we learned from Geoffrey Barraclough, an empire was an ideal that had little to do with political reality, 7 and the latter was hard to get at anyway, for all sources relevant to Carolingian political history had been produced by clerics, and were therefore far removed from the rough and tumble of actual politics. Admittedly, well into the 1980s this also remained my uninformed view of the matter. I must have transmitted it to students, without realising how much this gloomy perspective on Carolingian politics owed to the still authoritative publications from the late 1940s and 1950s that I had taken on board as a student. In the aftermath of the Second World War, empire and conquest had become tainted and therefore frozen topics, along with the entire migration period and its so-called Germanic tribes. 8 By the 1970s Dutch students specialising in medieval history were either attracted by the archive-based local or regional history of the later middle ages, or, in the case of early medievalists, in French histoire des mentalités. The latter legitimated the transformation of stuffy old church history into an exciting and novel study of early medieval religion, largely inspired by cultural anthropology. It was only much 8
The Empire That Was Always Decaying later, through studying Carolingian monastic ritual, in the mid-1980s, that I was confronted with the importance of monasticism for early medieval state formation; the next step was investigating the interface between early medieval religion and politics, and discovering that political history could be interesting as well as challenging.
9
Around the same time, British and American historians began to break out of the restrictive framework of the rise of modern national states, showing that although early medieval kingdoms were indeed different, they did work as political communities in their own right, both at the practical and ideological level, and not just as forerunners of France or Germany. 10 In order to rule, kings depended on the consensus and cooperation of their aristocracies, but the reverse also pertained: members of the elite competed for royal favour.
11
That Carolingian literacy had a broader base than was hitherto assumed, had profound implications, not just for understanding the participation of lay magnates in government, but also for the realisation that the religiously articulated political discourse had not just been produced by clerics for their own consumption, or as a top-down ecclesiastical ideology to be imposed on a passive laity.
12
These new approaches first and foremost focused on the Frankish kingdoms and regions, while Carolingian empire did not attract much scholarly attention. This tide started to turn around the year 2000. The upsurge of interest, which still continues, has two distinct yet complementary features. First, the predominantly Christian ideology of ›empire‹ is now taken seriously, as a force with an enduring impact outside a restricted clerical elite, and well beyond the later reign of Charlemagne and the early years of Louis. Secondly, ›empire‹, both in the sense of the title and the realm, is considered worth fighting for until the very end of the Carolingian dynasty. Of course the start of a new millennium has nothing to do with this revived interest in Carolingian empire, and all the more with the previous decade, which saw a fundamental shift of perspective with regard to both early medieval state formation and literacy. This opened the way for a reappraisal of the viability of this large-scale polity, also in terms of shared ideas on an imperial order that were not necessary detached from, or opposed to, ›political reality‹.
In the rest of this contribution, I will elaborate some more on these changed and changing perspectives, without claiming to offer anything like a complete historiographical survey; these comments are written from my own vantage point as a Dutch early medievalist trained in the 1970s. I then turn to the ninth century itself, and to some of the reflections on Carolingian imperium and its decay on the part of authors of the second half of that century. At the time, there were indeed voices that expressed feelings of loss and nostalgia for a glorious and peaceful Carolingian past, when augustus (either Charlemagne or Louis) still had the realm in hand. These references to an older and orderly imperial world that was lost after the division of 843 have often been cited in modern research as proof of the decline of the empire, but it was precisely during this so-called period of decay, from the 840s onwards, that the most explicit visions of Carolingian imperium were expressed, amidst much lament about the dismal present. Division, strife and upheaval formed a powerful impetus to voice hopes and aspirations for the retrieval of a lost world of united imperial rule. Whether these ideals had already been alive for earlier generations experiencing Frankish empire is a moot point, for they were not articulated as clearly as in the period of so-called decay of the Carolingian empire. All we can say is that this discourse of lost imperial unity and grandeur was very much part of the political reality of the second half of the ninth century.
Kingdoms versus empire There is no need to explain why after 1945 the Carolingian empire was no longer a popular topic of research -or any empire, for that matter. In the late 1940s the prominent Belgian historian Francois-Louis Ganshof published some influential articles with revealing titles such as ›Charlemagne's Failure‹, and ›The End of Charlemagne's Reign: A Decomposition‹. These articles were only translated into English in 1971, which helped to secure the long-term impact of these ideas, generated in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
13
Charlemagne as an imperial success-story definitely went out of favour, as did the Frankish empire as a whole. As Ganshof put it, this had been a ›conception divorced from reality held by empire-minded clerics, who saw in Charles a Roman emperor God had invested with a universal magistracy for the defence and exaltation of faith and Church‹.
14 Despite concerted attempts, especially in capitularies issued in 802, the imperial title gained in 800 added nothing to the usual business of Frankish kingship, and neither did it enhance relations with the papacy. 15 In Ganshof's words, ›the imperial mirage, compounded of the ideas and images brought back from Rome, must have quickly dissipated when it came in contact with realities: all the more rapidly in that the concept of empire was a clerical concept, which Charlemagne himself no doubt never fully grasped‹. 16 His conclusion: this empire was already far along the road towards decomposition when in 814 Louis the Pious succeeded his father.
17
The Belgian historian was less scathing about Louis than his Austrian colleague Heinrich Fichtenau, whose Das Karolingische Imperium (1946) painted a bleak picture of this failing ruler towards the end of his reign: ›An emperor without might or resources, a father in conflict with his sons, a pious Christian who heaped guilt on himself whenever he acted and even more so when he let things be‹. 18 Charlemagne had still been able to keep this empire in hand, but under Louis, everyone went back to a self-interested mode, most of all the so-called reformers who had seemingly adopted a monastic agenda but in fact pursued their own. peditions had become purely defensive ones. By then, the super-rich Frankish empire had turned into an attractive target for plunder, and ›the very success of Frankish imperialism in the eighth century had led to a shortage of victims who were both conquerable and profitable, which forced the aristocracy to revise its profit-and-loss assessment of warfare.‹
27
The only way out was internal expansion, that is, to say, the use of ecclesiastical property. As Reuter argued, most of Ganshof's ›decomposition‹ of the last phase of Charlemagne's reign had in fact been the result of military stagnation. Of course forgiveness and humility of the kind displayed by Louis the Pious became more desirable as resources dried up; the internal crisis of 830 were only a matter of structure and time, not of personalities or ideologies.
28
This struck a chord with the mostly Anglophone historians who were exploring the early medieval past as a foreign country, 29 but also with the German tradition of the Carolingian realm as Personenverbandsstaat. In Germany, also in the 1980s, a fierce debate erupted about ›Staatlichkeit‹: did anything of the sort exist in the Carolingian age? Johannes Fried answered this question in the negative, maintaining that ninth-century Frankish sources showed no sign of transpersonal or abstract concepts of a political community. The only possible exception was the notion of ecclesia which did seem to denote the Christian empire, but Fried dismissed this as mere ›clerical thinking‹, far removed from actual politics. 30 Hans-Werner
Goetz begged to differ, countering that the concept of regnum did refer to a territorial unit that existed regardless of personal ties between a ruler and his magnates, but he as well tended to ignore the connection between ecclesia and empire, for his case was built on the Carolingian discourse on regna.
31
All parties involved, including the majority outside Germany that remained unaware of the controversy on Carolingian Staatlichkeit, could accept Reuter's no-nonsense approach. It posed a welcome challenge to a version of the Carolingian empire that was still very much around in the 1980s: a rather starry-eyed notion of this splendid cultural predecessor of the current European Community, as it had been presented in 1965 during the great exhibitions on Charlemagne in Aachen, and had lived on ever since, especially in the public domain. For Reuter and many others at the time, this was mere ›ideology‹ produced by naïve modern historians and ninth-century clerics alike. Please note the negative connotation that the term Ideologie still has in German, and more in general, in a Marxist context. Economic and social structures determined the outlook of the normative sources, not the other way around.
With hindsight, the almost total absence of church and religion in these debates is striking. First and foremost, churchmen were seen as the providers of the ideology of the empire -often called the ›rhetoric of reform‹ but they were outside the hard-nosed world of politics, and if they entered it, it was as the clerical face of a self-interested aristocracy intent on countering royal attempts at centralisation. Reuter's views do raise some serious questions: was Louis the Pious really as adverse to warfare as he has been made out to be, and, more importantly, did royal/imperial control of monastic property not compensate to a large extent for the slower pace of conquest?
32 But by the early 1990s, when a big European-funded and 1997 were the social and economic transformations between c. 400 and c. 800, and the emergence of post-Roman kingdoms in the West with an ethnically-defined identity: ›Kingdoms of the Empire‹, as the title of one of the publications of the ensuing series called it. 34 Above all, this programme enabled a major confrontation between a multitude of national research traditions of which the participants had not been aware of. As it turned out, nationalism was not a thing of the past; i.e. in the early 1990s, the Yugoslav state broke up, and a series of vicious wars followed. 35 And this was of course part of the collapse of a contemporary imperial state, the Soviet Union. So, in fact, weren't large empires always bound to decline and fall? It is significant, I think, that the ›Carolingian‹ volume (c. 700-c. 900) of the New Cambridge Medieval History, published in 1995, does not feature ›empire‹ or imperium in its general index, nor in any of the chapter titles except in the one on book production. 36 All the same, there are signs of change there as well. For example, in Janet Nelson's contribution, which was not on empire but on ›Kingship and Royal Government‹, a topic on which she had just published an important book, Charles the Bald (1992), which inspired younger historians to work on later Carolingian rulers and reigns. 37 The notion that empire had not fundamentally changed Charlemagne's government remained in place, but plunder and tribute as the sole source of aristocratic loyalty was firmly rejected; royal control of church lands is signalled as an important alternative resource. The Carolingian empire's process of so-called dissolution, Nelson maintained, was also one of resolution and reformation; however, it did not implode.
38
The year 1995 also saw the publication of a collection of articles on early medieval immunities and the ways in which these had underpinned, rather than undermined, royal resources.
39
Nelson contributed to this, but also Reuter himself, who thereby helped to create a paradigm shift that went straight against his earlier work -surely the mark of a great scholar. The overall emphasis on the otherness of early medieval societies of the 1980s may have gone overboard a bit, but all things considered, these new approaches to the early medieval political order, inspired by anthropology and social history, provided a much-needed antidote against the anachronistic association of political history with national states or their so-called precursors. 40 This in turn prepared the ground for a fresh look at the Carolingian By the turn of the millennium, Carolingian imperium was definitely back on the agenda. That Johannes Fried publicly declared that Charlemagne had engineered his own imperial coronation, rather than having it foisted on him by the pope, was a sure sign that the mood was changing, even in Germany. 44 In into account Reuter's views, but concludes that the cessation of wars of conquest in the early 800 ›catalysed a dramatic shift in this culture which meant the roles of every member of the elite, from the royal family had to be redefined‹. The term empire ›had to be invented in the imaginations and mentalities of its elites‹. 52 The familiar mantra that the imperial coronation did not radically alter Charlemagne's rule is reiterated, yet the emphasis is on the greater intensity of the ruler's attempts at effective control, from 802 onwards. 53 As to its success, the answer is fairly positive and a far cry from Ganshof New work on the Carolingian empire keeps appearing. Some of it remains focused on its ideological aspects, but without having to apologise for ideals that are clerical and therefore far removed from political reality; the topics recently explored range from a re-examination of the expression imperium 55 and ›empire‹ as a Christian community writ large 56 to the impact of Carolingian notions of ›empire‹ on later centuries. 57 At the same time, the practical side of imperial power and authority has become a central concern to the point of moving centre stage. 58 As I wrote most of this paper in August 2015, Jennifer R. Davis' new book appeared: unfortunately too late for me to take it on board here. But its title speaks volumes: Charlemagne's Practice of Empire.
59

Carolingian empire and decay: some contemporary voices
The overall image we are left with, after two decades of research, is one of a Carolingian world in which rulers and their leading men shared a strong sense of order, and the determination to implement this in the real world. Conflict was as much a regular feature of ninth-century politics as consensus, and it was behind much of the more articulate reflections on the nature and cohesion of the polity. Bishops and abbots were very much part of the governing elite, controlling lands that were essential to the military survival of the state. 60 According to ninth-century usage, imperium did not so much refer to a clearly-defined territorial unit as to the exercise of imperial authority by the senior member(s) of the Carolingian dynasty who bore the title augustus imperator. It was the unanimity between Louis and his sons, including his co-emperor Lothar, This Christian-imperial discourse is not very evident during Charlemagne's reign; it only fully emerged under Louis the Pious, and only really came into its own after 840, when according to traditional modern historiography, the decline of empire was already a fact. The ninth-century imperial discourse lent plenty of support to modern grand narratives about the decline of empire, for apart from triumphalist voices it also features dire complaints about the loss of unity and moral purpose that had once existed. The latter are best understood as witnesses to a growing awareness of what a united Christian polity and its leadership should be like, with ideas that were further articulated through the series of dynastic crises that started in the early 830s.
In the narrative sources in question, the expressions regnum and imperium were often used interchangeably, as is the case in a brief but celebrated reference to the Carolingian empire: the opening sentences to the Gesta Karoli written by the monk Notker from St. Gall, sometime between 885 and 887, very shortly before the last emperor's deposition in 888. 63 Notker had no idea of what was coming, so his adaptation of King Nebuchadnezzar's dream (Daniel 2, 36) is unabashedly imperialist, even though he wrote consistently about regnum, rather than imperium. After having smashed the lead and clay statue that symbolised the previous four world powers, including the Roman Empire, God had created another with the Carolingians at its head. Charlemagne represented ›the golden head of a second and no less remarkable statue‹, a Frankish empire of which the Greeks and Romans were of course greatly envious. 64 Notker meant the Byzantines, and the inhabitants of the city of Rome; whereas the latter habitually opposed anyone of importance connected to the apostolic see, 65 Charles was the Defender of the Church of Rome. This text certainly had eschatological overtones, 66 but it was also very much part of a highly concrete and terrestrial Frankish imperial imagination in which Charlemagne took ›Persian‹ envoys hunting and proved his superiority.
67
The very fact that the death and the name of the elephant Abul Abbas, the gift of a fellow emperor from the East, were recorded in the Royal Frankish Annals of 810, makes it clear that imperium was not just an idea connected with the end of times. This was about interimperial one-upmanship involving organs and impressive beasts, symbols of the complementary world rule of Franks, Greeks and Persians. the grounds that only Frankish witnesses had been present, not Saxon ones. Protesting about this to the Emperor Louis and his entourage, Hraban maintained that the Saxons had been conquered and then converted by the Franks. As newcomers to Christianity, they had no right to reject Frankish witnesses; throughout history, under the Persians as well as the Romans, the conquered gentes had obeyed imperial rule. As the successor of Roman imperium, Frankish rule deserved a similar respect. 68 In his prolific exegesis, Hraban wrote about many biblical kings in imperial terms, for they governed many peoples; Queen Esther, likened to Louis's wife, the Empress Judith, was a case in point. Esther's husband, King Ahasveros, was an imperial figure because of his multi-ethnic realm.
69
This was the Carolingian empire as in ruling a multitude of converted gentes drawn into the Frankish/Christian fold, but it could also mean the Saxons were becoming an integral part of the Frankish populus, as Einhard expressed it. The terminology remained fluid. Einhard is an interesting witness to empire, precisely because his remark that Charlemagne would never have entered St Peter's Basilica on Christmas Day 800, had he known what would hit him, has so often been invoked as proof of some kind of Frankish ambivalence about the imperial title. Humility was one of the key virtues of late antique Christian emperors, however, and in other respects as well, Einhard's Vita Karoli is an eloquent testimony to imperial rule: Charlemagne is portrayed as lending his support to the Christians of the East, including Jerusalem, Alexandria and Carthage.
70 Not only did he order the codification of the laws of all the nations under his rule, he also had old songs in his mother tongue written down, started on a grammar in his native language and used this to rename the months and the winds; how imperial can one get? Notwithstanding Einhard's consistent use of regnum Francorum in his post-800 narrative, his is a portrait of truly imperial greatness.
71
Einhard's brilliant literary experiment, with its subtle use of Suetonius' biography of Augustus should not blind us to the fact that the model empire of the past was not so much ancient pagan Rome, but its late antique and Christian successor that came into existence in 313. This world of Constantine, and above all of Theodosius and Ambrose, provided ideal imperial history to Frankish authors. Given that this was also the age of the Fathers -Jerome, Ambrose and Augustine -upon which Carolingian biblical exegesis was built, this Christian imperial past functioned much like biblical history: as an imagined community that constantly impinged on the present. When it comes to assessing ninth-century complaints about ›decay of empire‹, it should be kept in mind that these two yardsticks, biblical and late antique-imperial, underpinned all judgements of decline in the more recent Carolingian past, and often were thought more fundamental than contemporary history. The crucial question in political reflection was, where and when did we fall short of these illustrious examples? One defence of Louis's repeated public penances was that he had been ›like Theodosius‹; one of his detractors called him Ahab, incapable of mastering his Jezebel/Judith. This authoritative imperial past did not emerge overnight on Christmas Day 800. The building blocks were there, of course, but erecting the entire edifice took time. The process itself has recently and aptly been summed up under the heading of ›learning empire‹. 73 Hence, it is not surprising that an eloquent statement about empire such as Notker's dates from what modern historians deemed to be the very end of the Carolingian imperium. The discourse of empire in terms of ecclesia was initiated by biblical scholars such as Hraban, and embraced by those who drafted Louis' capitularies and conciliar acts, but it only really took off after this emperor's death in 840 and the ensuing struggle for the empire among his three remaining sons. The battle of Fontenoy in June 841 became a traumatic watershed: many leading Franks died on the battlefield in a way still prevented in 833. By then it was also clear that the three remaining heirs of Louis were not going to rule in unison. 74 The first references to this lost world, perhaps infused with nostalgia but still very real to the political actors turned authors who had been part of it, date from the 840s and 850s. imperium was a key concept, not as a territorial notion but as the joint authority of those participating in imperial rule. Another expression full of meaning used by both these authors was publicus: this was the domain of the Carolingian commonwealth, the res publica. This was opposed to anything that was privatus -the deprived and immoral world of those who pursued their own interests. 76 Political and personal animosity were behind Nithard's terse and classically-inspired prose, but his is as clear a statement as any about a severely challenged world of Carolingian ›universal empire‹ (universum imperium) as he called it.
77
These are by no means the only narratives produced after Louis's death in 840 that tried to come to terms with the dynastic upheaval during and shortly after this emperor's reign.
78
The most interesting text, on which I can comment only briefly on here, is the Epitaphium Arsenii by Paschasius Radbertus (d. 860) . 79 This monk and one-time abbot of Corbie and one of the most gifted biblical commentators of his day and age, also wrote funeral orations for his illustrious mentors and predecessors, Adalhard and Wala. The former was nicknamed Antony, the latter Arsenius, names chosen by their inner circles at the court and in Corbie from the authoritative past of imperial Christianity. These cousins of Charlemagne became great abbots after an equally illustrious secular career. As in the case of Nithard's Histories, Radbert's Epitaphium Arsenii had a huge impact on modern views of the decline of the Carolingian empire, yet the diffusion of these texts in their own day and age was extremely limited. 80 These were works written for a restricted and court-connected circle, including rulers. »For there is nobody so insane that he would call it a sin to act with sacred counsel, for fidelity, for the life of Caesar, for the sons and imperial rule (imperio), for the salvation of the people and the deliverance of the fatherland, for the justice and laws of the emperors (augusti), for the stability and unity of the kingdom (regnum), and the concord of peace, for the averting of vices and abominations, because of adultery, which is the worst of these, and because of the abuse of the entire empire (imperium).« 83 This is just one of many instances in which regnum and imperium have much more than a purely territorial connotation. Radbert, who had been deposed as Corbie's abbot by the time he penned his polemical second book in the 850s, lamented a world of imperial unity he had lost, but this unity was above all the unanimity of the Carolingian rulers and their leading Obviously, these aliases were intended for a small audience of insiders who knew their Christian imperial history as well as their biblical past, but this select group did not merely consist of monks of Corbie. The issues raised by Radbert in the Epitaph's second book were relevant to all those who had been caught up in the political whirlwinds of the early 830s, and were still debating the meaning of it all two decades later. Clearly the fact that Louis had been an emperor, and that they had served under imperial rule, mattered deeply. By the mid850s, when Radbert added his second book, his ruler was Charles the Bald, a king (rex) who had started well with regard to protecting monasteries such as Corbie, but who had been found wanting in the long run. 87 The imperial unity of the past had been lost because nobody at the time had listened to Wala's dire warnings, with the result that ›up to the present day, none of the rulers can show the commonwealth the way towards justice‹. 88 So this text was indeed an ›epitaph for an era‹, yet it is also one of the most articulate statements about what imperial rule should entail. This largely overlapped with the ecclesia, but the question was how to keep the two orders within it apart. The secular and the clerical domain should remain distinct, so that they would be able to operate in a complementary mode. Without this distinction, there would be no co-operation under the aegis of a legitimate monarch, who allowed himself to be advised by the likes of Wala, an expert on the way in which imperial rule worked. He had even managed to counter corruption in Italy! This is Rabert's message in his funeral oration for a man who is presented as the epitome of service to the augusti of his day and age.
Conclusion
In modern scholarship, the Epitaphium Arsenii has become one of the key witnesses to the view that decline of the Carolingian empire set in with the crisis of Louis' reign; Einhard's Vita Karoli served as the peg for another invented tradition, closely associated with the Kulturkampf and the late nineteenth century, according to which Charlemagne would have avoided the empire and the ensuing connection with papal Rome, had he known what was coming. Ninth-century narratives and normative texts have offered plenty of footholds for modern historians who saw the decay of empire everywhere, or who deemed the imperial title superfluous to Charlemagne's already successful rule. He was the only Carolingian emperor that continued to have a real impact on European memory. After him it all went downhill, for a very long time. Yet the very sources that once underpinned this gloomy view of Carolingian empire, now support a much more upbeat approach to this phenomenon. Investigating this topic therefore needs to be a dual operation: studying early medieval sources in conjunction with their subsequent layers of modern interpretation. In this rather impressionist paper I have sketched some of the changes that occurred since 1945, when those who had lived through World War II were understandably not very enthusiastic about ›empire‹ and all that it stood for. Post-war scholarship on the Carolingian period reveals a constant tension between a modernising perspective, which soon becomes anachronistic if pushed to its extremes, and archaising tendencies that turn the early Middle Ages into an exotic and utterly foreign country. This tension has proven fruitful, provided those involved are aware of it, a tenet that also holds true for research on the Carolingian empire. It is nowadays conducted by a generation that has found a new balance between the modernity and otherness of this period, and no longer has to write about empire in terms of dichotomies: ideal versus reality, or clerical ideology versus aristocratic power. This is a past which does seem like a foreign country at first, but getting to know it is not entirely impossible. 
